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Bringing Clout to the Masses: An In-Depth
Look at the “Legal Fake” Phenomenon
Nicole Kim*
A snaking line of customers that wraps around the block leading
to a minimalist, yet iconoclastic store can only mean one thing: drop
day. Rain or shine, devoted fans of brands such as Supreme, Palace,
and Off-White, among others, are willing to spend their time and
money for the opportunity to cop the latest and most exclusive items.
In recent years, the rise of streetwear has projected once-underground skater labels to the forefront of youth culture, mainstream
society, and high fashion. Not only has this movement affected niche
designers and traditional luxury names, but streetwear has also reshaped the consumer experience. However, the continued evolution
and globalization of fashion, fueled by the near-instantaneous speed
of the internet and social media, has brought the seemingly novel
issue of legal fakes to the forefront. In reality, legal fakes are a facelifted version of counterfeiting and traditional trademark squatting.
By “legally” registering a stolen trademark, impostor companies
run their entire business under the guise of a well-known brand. To
address this threat, this Note examines the intricacies of a typical
legal fake scheme, from its shady origins, to widespread distribution
of fake products, to its eventual demise in litigation. This Note further proposes a solution requiring multinational cooperation in order to seal the cracks in international trademark law through which
legal fakes have slipped.

*
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Author thanks Sara Mazurek, Katherine Ballington, David Devich, Laura Rann, Caroline
Vermillion, and Professor Susan Scafidi for their assistance, feedback, and revision in the
writing of this Note.
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INTRODUCTION
From up-and-coming fashion designers creating products that
pay tribute to the works of well-known artists, to young brands
adopting the business strategies of established companies, players in
the fashion industry are no strangers to copying. One may even argue that the act of copying serves as the driving force behind the
traditional life cycle of luxury fashion. The first step begins with
high-profile fashion labels designing products that are adopted by
high-status or affluent consumers.1 These products serve as “social
signaling devices,” creating a new trend among other groups who
seek to emulate the original purchasers.2 Third-party brands seeking
to join the trend subsequently draw inspiration from these designs
and create lines of similar items at lower prices and in greater quantities.3 As comparable products—whether legitimate or knock-off—
flood the market and become available to the general public (i.e.,
“the masses”), the trend becomes passé and the cycle begins anew.4
However, the modern age of fashion has essentially rendered
this traditional cycle obsolete.5 Advances in textile technology have
facilitated the high-speed distribution of low-quality knockoffs in
large volumes.6 Further, certain third-party brands define “inspiration” rather loosely.7 In an effort to mimic luxury fashion houses,
obscure companies have seemingly appeared from thin air with the
singular goal of stealing and registering trademarked names, manufacturing identical products, and adopting duplicate business structures.8 The most successful impostors have even come to supplant
original brands in limited foreign markets, profiting by duping consumers.9
1

See Susan Scafidi, Intellectual Property and Fashion Design, in 1 INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY AND INFORMATION WEALTH: ISSUES AND PRACTICES IN THE DIGITAL AGE 115,
125 (Peter K. Yu ed., 2006).
2
Id.
3
See id.
4
See id.
5
See id.
6
See id. at 116, 125.
7
Cf. id. at 118.
8
See infra Part II.
9
See Silvia Grazioli, Legal Fakes and the Shopping Experience – Italy’s Fashion
Challenges,
WORLD
TRADEMARK
REV.
(June
29,
2018),
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Within the fashion industry, the term “legal fake” is used to describe this type of harrowing scheme.10 Upon first glance, the term
is a puzzling oxymoron—how can something be both legitimate yet
fake at the same time?11 Under its most basic definition, a legal fake
is a phenomenon by which a third-party company precedes the original brand company in registering the trademark and running the entire business—from production to sales—in another country where
the original brand has yet to be launched.12 The “legal” portion of
the term is derived from the technically legitimate loophole that
third-party companies take by registering the mark in an official
trademark office.13 “Fake” is derived from the fact that the third
party is essentially an impostor posing as the original brand in the
registration and business operation.14
This phenomenon is greatly intertwined with the streetwear industry.15 This subset of the fashion industry, commonly associated
with social media influencers and outrageously expensive hoodies
and sneakers, has risen in status to high-fashion luxury houses while
managing to stay grounded in a close-knit relationship with consumers—at least the ones who can afford to purchase products.16 The
unique balance of streetwear’s characteristics has created the perfect
environment for legal fake impostors to proliferate. Recent controversies involving big names in the industry have quickly rippled

https://www.worldtrademarkreview.com/brand-management/legal-fakes-and-shoppingexperience-italys-fashion-challenges [https://perma.cc/HLZ5-AF8K].
10
See id.
11
Lorraine Tay et al., The Phenomenon of “Legal Fakes”: A Supreme Contradiction?,
BIRD & BIRD LLP (Feb. 2019), https://www.twobirds.com/en/news/articles/2019/
singapore/the-phenomenon-of-legal-fakes-a-supreme-contradiction
[https://perma.cc/LP52-PD4A].
12
See Grazioli, supra note 9.
13
See id.
14
See id.
15
“Streetwear” and “streetwear industry” will be used interchangeably.
16
See Zep Parry, ‘From Hood to Haute’: The Luxurification of Streetwear 18 (June 14,
2018) (B.A. project report, Amsterdam University of Applied Sciences) (on file with
author); see also Marjorie van Elven, The Business of Hype: Why So Many Fashion Brands
Are Now Doing “Product Drops,” FASHIONUNITED (Oct. 17, 2018),
https://fashionunited.uk/
news/retail/the-business-of-hype-why-so-many-fashion-brands-are-now-doing-productdrops/2018101739501 [https://perma.cc/J6PC-HRRH].
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concern throughout the fashion industry as a whole.17
In recent years, legal fakes have become a troubling trend that
many fashion brands face with limited legal solutions.18 While there
are currently international treaties in place to mitigate and prevent
some of the damage,19 the uneven patchwork of intellectual property
laws around the world leaves brands seeking to expand their businesses overseas vulnerable to impostors in foreign countries. This
Note highlights the pernicious threat to brands posed by the legal
fake phenomenon and the resulting legal implications. It proposes a
solution involving international cooperation among countries to harmonize, strengthen, and streamline the trademark regime.
The discussion proceeds in the following parts: Part I explains
streetwear’s development and role in influencing the legal fake phenomenon in the traditional luxury market. This section also reviews
the applicable legal theories and current international treaties in
place. Part II examines a recent, well-publicized controversy involving one of the most recognizable streetwear brands worldwide—Supreme—and its larger implications in international intellectual property law. Finally, Part III proposes a solution by advocating for continental harmonization of trademark laws, a consolidated registration process, and relevant international adjudicating bodies.
I. CREATION OF A LEGAL FAKE MOOD-BOARD
The legal fake phenomenon stems from the interplay of current
laws and the nature of the victimized industries. Impostor companies
can simultaneously take advantage of the streetwear’s peculiarity as
an exclusive insider’s club—low inventory, high demand, recognizable logos—as well as loopholes in the international trademark

17

See Grazioli, supra note 9 (affecting brands such as Boy London, Supreme, Kith,
Pyrex; registered in Italy as Boy London Italia, Supreme Italia, Kith Official, and Pyrex
Original, respectively).
18
See Tay et al., supra note 11 (depending on specific facts of the case, various
maneuvers may not be available for all brand owners).
19
See Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property art. 1, Mar. 20, 1883,
828 U.N.T.S. 305 (creating “a union for the protection of industrial property”) [hereinafter
Paris Convention]; see also Madrid Agreement Concerning the International Registration
of Marks art. 1, Apr. 14, 1891, 828 U.N.T.S. 389 [hereinafter Madrid Agreement].
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law regime.20 The first section will explore the origins of streetwear’s subculture, its crossover into mainstream luxury fashion, and
how its focus on exclusivity distinguishes it from the traditional luxury fashion market. The subsequent section will examine the development of existing international trademark law that has established
these loopholes, allowing impostors to flourish.
A. Swatches of Streetwear
A precise definition of the term “streetwear” remains elusive.21
To some, streetwear represents a highly individualized style that integrates themes of skate, basketball, and hip-hop.22 Others adopt a
definition that embodies a movement “centered around fashionable,
casual clothes, including t-shirts, hoodies, and sneakers.”23 To yet
another group, the term itself has become irrelevant, a “diluted” visual and verbal buzzword.24 Regardless, streetwear is a constantly
evolving movement with different flavors in urban communities
spread across the globe.25
1. From the Skate Park to the Runway
Set to a rebellious punk-rock soundtrack, the origin of North
American streetwear stems from the fusion of West Coast surf and
East Coast hip-hop cultures in the eighties and nineties.26 At that
time, the four pillars of hip-hop culture—music, dance, fashion, and

20

See infra Part II.
See Parry, supra note 16, at 5 (explaining that it has become increasingly difficult to
define “streetwear”).
22
See Mayan Rajendran, The Development of Streetwear and the Role Of New York
City, London, and Supreme NY 1 (Jan. 1, 2012) (M.A. thesis, Ryerson University) (on file
with author).
23
See How Streetwear Brands and Consumers Are Toppling Previously Understood
Notions of Luxury and Exclusivity, FASHION L. (May 29, 2019),
https://www.thefashionlaw.com/how-streetwear-and-its-consumers-are-topplingpreviously-understood-notions-of-luxury-and-status/
[https://perma.cc/5VJW-JDNB]
[hereinafter Streetwear Toppling Notions].
24
See Zoe Suen, Streetwear Took Over the Fashion Industry. Now What?, BUS. OF
FASHION (Nov. 6, 2019, 5:20 AM), https://www.businessoffashion.com/articles/luxury/
streetwear-took-over-the-fashion-industry-now-what-supreme-stussy
[https://perma.cc/D4GF-PT8L].
25
See Parry, supra note 16, at 5.
26
See id.
21
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art—were deeply embedded in common threads of rebellion and
protest.27 The expression of these themes resulted in rap,
breakdance, graffiti art, and a distinct fashion style that eventually
became known as “streetwear.”28
Stüssy was the first mainstream fashion brand to emerge from
this cultural mashup, believed by many consumers to be the originator of the modern streetwear as recognized by consumers today.29
In the 1970s, founder Shawn Stüssy “made his name in Southern
California, the [epicenter] of skating and surfing, shaping high quality surfboards by hand,” decorated with his authentic signature.30
Though originally created as a way to promote business, the unexpected popularity of t-shirts bearing his iconic signature marked the
inception of a worldwide apparel brand.31
The nineties also introduced SoHo, New York as a streetwear
hub.32 Stüssy opened its first brick-and-mortar store in collaboration
with James Jebbia, Supreme’s founder.33 The spirited, lower Manhattan neighborhood soon became a “melting pot of everything
youthful and avant-garde—a place where skate, hip-hop culture and
artists like Basquiat and Haring came together.”34 SoHo became a
trendy gathering place, catering to “skaters, graffiti artists, underground filmmakers and rappers.”35
However, streetwear’s increased popularity and introduction
into the mainstream caused tension with the maintenance of its
niche, underground roots.36 New brands—such as A Bathing Ape,
FUBU, and Spitfire—began materializing around the world to similarly capitalize on the trend.37 Despite increased competition and
27

Id. at 6.
See id.
29
Miguel Lobo de Macedo, The Evolution of Streetwear 14 (May 2015) (M.A.
dissertation, Universidade Católica, Faculdade de Economia e Gestão) (on file with
author).
30
Parry, supra note 16, at 6.
31
Id.
32
Id.
33
Jebbia founded Union New York in 1989, and Supreme in 1994. Id.
34
Id. at 6–7.
35
Id. at 7.
36
See id.
37
Id.
28
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exposure, brands such as Stüssy and Supreme actively constrained
inventory and distribution levels to retain their exclusive images.38
This era reflected a shift in the importance of brand image as consumers began to value wearing certain logos and brands to signify
their own identities.39
Streetwear’s continued evolution and growing popularity eventually crossed over into the high fashion sector.40 The blurred lines
between high fashion and streetwear have become more apparent in
recent years, exemplified by both big names in streetwear being appointed to creative positions in traditional fashion houses, and streetwear-luxury collaborations.41 For example, in 2018, Virgil Abiloh,
creator of streetwear label Off-White, was named artistic director of
the menswear division at Louis Vuitton.42 Collaborations, such as
the Louis Vuitton x Supreme capsule collection at the 2017 Paris
Fashion Week and the Gucci x Dapper Dan “ready-to-wear” line,
reflect the increasingly consumer-driven intermingling of luxury
and streetwear sectors.43
Despite representing substantial portions of apparel and footwear markets, as well as perpetuating the influx of casual wear on
the runway for multiple seasons, streetwear’s hype has dimmed as
luxury brands transition into new styles.44 It remains to be seen
whether the damage done by legal fakes has advanced the life cycle
of streetwear to its end. However, as discussed below, the impact of
streetwear on society and consumer experience will live on.

38

Id.
Id.
40
Id. at 8.
41
See Suen, supra note 24.
42
See Vanessa Friedman & Elizabeth Paton, Louis Vuitton Names Virgil Abloh as Its
New Men’s Wear Designer, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 26, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/
2018/03/26/business/louis-vuitton-virgil-abloh.html [https://perma.cc/SB7R-YVLD].
43
See Jake Woolf, Supreme x Louis Vuitton Is Real and Here’s What You Need to Know
(Update), GQ (Jan. 19, 2017), https://www.gq.com/story/supreme-louis-vuittoncollaboration-2017 [https://perma.cc/T2L9-D82P]; see also Gucci-Dapper Dan: The
Collection, GUCCI, https://www.gucci.com/us/en/st/stories/advertising-campaign/article/
pre-fall-2018-dapper-dan-collection-shoppable [https://perma.cc/9Q5N-7DPA].
44
See Suen, supra note 24.
39
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2. Characteristics of Streetwear
Typical streetwear brands known by consumers today are built
from an array of defining traits, including a focus on logo-branded
products, business models built on scarcity, and a heavy social media presence.45 The combination of these traits, among other niche
quirks, distinguishes streetwear from other fashion subindustries,
such as traditional high fashion predecessors.46
A streetwear brand’s logo, name, or other identifying mark is at
the forefront of consumer recognition, whether printed, stamped, or
embroidered.47 A survey of the industry’s most recognizable names
demonstrates a penchant for relatively simplistic logos placed on
basic items: Supreme’s infamous “box logo hoodie” consists of a
plain sweatshirt with a small, centered logo,48 while Comme de Garçon’s “PLAY t-shirt” is completely blank except for a tiny, embroidered red heart.49 However simplistic the design may be, many consumers believe the logo itself represents more than the t-shirt on
which it is printed.50
Business strategies used by the most successful brands reflect an
emphasis on one word: exclusivity.51 Whereas the traditional fashion system was driven by high price points and craftsmanship,
streetwear focuses on making exclusive and highly desirable products.52 Brands with a strong following can create a scarcity frenzy
by “releas[ing] a large number of different products,” but each in
very low quantities.53 This principle is best demonstrated by a

45

See Parry, supra note 16, at 7, 11, 15.
See id. at 18.
47
See Macedo, supra note 29, at 54.
48
SUPREME,
https://www.supremenewyork.com/
[https://perma.cc/A7BL-25Y9]
(depicting the logo).
49
Dover Street Market, a retailer of streetwear brands, stocks Comme de Garçons
merchandise
that
can
be
seen
online.
DOVER
STREET
MARKET,
https://shop.doverstreetmarket.com/us/comme-des-garcons/play [https://perma.cc/R44L5VG7].
50
See Macedo, supra note 29, at 42.
51
See Streetwear Toppling Notions, supra note 23.
52
See id.
53
Damian Fowler, The Hype Machine: Streetwear and the Business of Scarcity, BBC
(Feb. 5, 2018), https://www.bbc.com/worklife/article/20180205-the-hype-machinestreetwear-and-the-business-of-scarcity [https://perma.cc/X8MX-ZKK8].
46
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strategy now known as “the drop.”54 For example, every Thursday
morning at eleven o’clock, Supreme “drops” the latest merchandise
on its website and opens the doors to its twelve flagship stores
worldwide, often selling out the entire online inventory in seconds.55
Finally, the development of online platforms and social media
has shaped the way streetwear brands interact with their ever-expanding consumer base. Online blogs such as Hypebeast and
Highsnobiety, along with Instagram “influencers,” allow readers
from all over the world to be “in the know” on newest items.56 Along
with drop-culture and social media’s influence, streetwear’s legacy
also stems from the creation of a new type of consumer. This culmination of social media presence, hype, and exclusivity form an engaged community in which the typical streetwear consumer must be
aware of launch dates, drop times, and current collaborations.57 Consumers from around the world form a global community that is constantly refreshing, liking, sharing, and updating each other on the
newest and most-popular brands.58
B. Palette of Relevant Legal Theories
The “legal” aspect of legal fakes ultimately stems from impostors’ literal regard for adherence to the law, though accomplished in
a backdoor way. Because of limited protection and the relative ease
of registration, even for unregistered marks, trademark law is generally seen as the most applicable and flexible protection mechanism
for fashion brands.59 At the same time, however, this convenience
invites impostors to explore intricacies of international trademark
law to gain a foothold over original brands in untapped markets.60
This Note discusses both the history and development of international trademark law, and the relevant doctrines that shaped the

54

van Elven, supra note 16.
See Andrea Tuzio, In How Many Seconds Do Supreme Items Sell Out?, NSS MAG.
(Mar. 19, 2019), https://www.nssmag.com/en/fashion/18056/in-quanti-secondi-vannosold-out-gli-item-supreme [https://perma.cc/HY7X-8ZNZ].
56
See Parry, supra note 16, at 11.
57
van Elven, supra note 16.
58
See Parry, supra note 16, at 12, 15.
59
See Scafidi, supra note 1, at 121.
60
See infra Part II.
55
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current scheme. A corollary, unfair competition law (and its subsidiary, parasitic unfair competition law) is used to supplant that which
trademark law does not reach.
1. Trademark Law
a) International Treaties in Trademark Law
Created in 1883, the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property (“Paris Convention”) was the first multilateral
agreement governing patents, trademarks, and unfair competition.61
At a high level, the Paris Convention acted as a pact between member nations to give the same trademark rights to both members’ own
citizens and the citizens of other member nations.62 Importantly, the
agreement further recognized the trademark territoriality principle:
a mark exists only under the laws of each sovereign nation.63
The most notable section of the Paris Convention was Article
6bis, under which countries agreed to police domestic trademark
registries on behalf of foreign owners of famous or well-known
marks already registered in other member countries.64 Specifically,
Article 6bis allowed member countries to refuse, cancel, or prohibit
the use of a domestic trademark that was considered by “competent
authority,” to be an imitation of an existing, well-known mark, used
for similar goods, and likely to create confusion.65 This provision
signified an important development in international trademark law:
whereas the burden to both police a mark and bring grounds for cancellation against infringers traditionally fell on the holder, the new
system only required the holder of a famous or “well-known” mark
to request cancellation of a confusingly similar mark, even if the
infringing mark was made in good faith.66

61

Paris Convention, supra note 19, at 307 (creating “a Union for the protection of
industrial property”).
62
5 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION §
29:25 (5th ed. 2020).
63
See id.
64
See Paris Convention, supra note 19, at 325.
65
Id.
66
See id.
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Although the language in the Paris Convention appeared to mandate protection for famous marks registered in foreign countries, the
term “well-known” remained undefined.67 The treaty merely characterized such marks as “being already the mark of a person entitled
to the benefits of this Convention . . . .”68 Further, because the language lacked specific guidance, the World Intellectual Property Organization (“WIPO”) issued a report entitled, “Joint Recommendation Concerning Provisions on the Protection of Well-Known
Marks.”69 This report provided several, non-binding factors in the
analysis, including:
(1) the degree of knowledge or recognition of the mark in a relevant sector of the public; (2) the duration, extent and geographical
area of any use of the mark; (3) the duration, extent and geographical
area of any promotion of the mark . . . ; (4) the duration and geographical area of any registrations . . . ; (5) the record of successful
enforcement of rights in the mark . . . ; and (6) the value associated
with the mark.70
Because these factors were not binding, countries were free to
incorporate them at their discretion.71 Unsurprisingly, this resulted
in widely inconsistent judicial outcomes.72
Despite shortcomings with textual ambiguity, the Paris Convention represented a significant development for international trademark law.73 Traditionally, the burden to police infringing marks was
left to the original owner, requiring affirmative grounds for

67

See generally id. at 301–13.
Id. at 325.
69
World Intell. Prop. Org. [WIPO], Joint Recommendation Concerning Provisions on
the Protection of Well-Known Marks, No. 833(E) (2000), https://www.wipo.int/edocs/
pubdocs/en/wipo_pub_833-accessible1.pdf [https://perma.cc/7QZN-YXWP].
70
Id. at 6.
71
See id.; Kitsuron Sangsuvan, Trademark Squatting, 31 WIS. INT’L L.J. 252, 285
(2013).
72
See Sangsuvan, supra note 71, at 284.
73
See Zachary Shufro, Haute Couture’s Paper Shield: The Madrid Protocol and the
Absence of International Trademark Enforcement Mechanisms, 45 N.C. J. INT’L L. 645,
661 (2020).
68
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cancelling a confusingly-similar mark.74 The Paris Convention,
however, favored the trademark owner by simply requiring cancellation request for a confusingly-similar mark, even if made in good
faith, provided the original mark was “well-known.”75
In 1891, the Madrid Agreement Concerning the International
Registration of Marks (“Madrid Agreement”) expanded upon the
trademark provisions introduced by the Paris Convention.76
Whereas the former system required a trademark holder to obtain
separate registrations in every member country in which protection
was sought, the Madrid Agreement created a streamlined process
allowing an owner’s singular, domestic registration to serve as the
basis for registration in any other member nation.77 After a domestic
registration in a member country was registered in the International
Bureau of Intellectual Property (“IB”), the mark’s protection in each
contracting country was treated “as [if] the mark had been filed
therein direct.”78 In effect, the Madrid Agreement gave international
registrants “a bundle of national applications, each subject to the domestic legislation of the designated nations.”79
Following the 1967 establishment of WIPO and its mandate to
“promote the protection of intellectual property throughout the
world through cooperation among the states,”80 the provisions of the
Madrid Agreement were adapted in the 1989 Protocol Relating to
the Madrid Agreement Concerning the International Registration of
Marks (“Madrid Protocol”).81 Like the Madrid Agreement, this protocol secures protection of IB-registered marks in each member
country as if filed directly, but reduces the term duration from
74

See Jessica E. Lanier, Note, Effective Policing: Giving Trademark Holders a PreEmptive Strike Against “Genericide,” 20 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 247, 259 (2014)
(discussing courts’ treatment of cease and desist letters in this context).
75
See Paris Convention, supra note 19, at 325.
76
See Madrid Agreement, supra note 19.
77
Id. at 393.
78
See id. at 399.
79
MCCARTHY, supra note 62, at § 29:31.
80
Convention Establishing the World Intellectual Property Organization art. 3, July 14,
1967, 828 U.N.T.S. 3.
81
See generally World Intell. Prop. Org. [WIPO], Protocol Relating to the Madrid
Agreement Concerning the International Registration of Marks, WIPO Publ’n No. 207E/21
(June 27, 1989), https://www.wipo.int/edocs/pubdocs/en/wipo_pub_207_2021.pdf
[https://perma.cc/T9XU-JGX6] [hereinafter “Madrid Protocol”].
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twenty years to ten years.82 Unlike the Madrid Agreement, which
required a domestic registration, the Madrid Protocol includes new
provisions that, for example, permit a domestic application to also
serve as the basis for an international registration.83 These provisions are especially attractive to U.S. companies that are now permitted to simply file a U.S. Intent-to-Use (“ITU”) application. An
applicant who has yet to actually use his or her mark in commerce
can now file an ITU application and immediately qualify for Madrid
Protocol registration, advantageously granting an early priority date
abroad.84
Finally, in 1995, the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property Rights (“TRIPS Agreement”) was negotiated
in response to growing globalization concerns, resulting in counterfeit goods’ proliferation.85 The TRIPS Agreement updated the Madrid arrangement (both the Agreement and Protocol) to recognize
fair use for descriptive terms, reduce the term of protection to seven
years, and create use requirements.86 By further including provisions
that ranged from broader protectionary measures to criminal sanctions, the TRIPS Agreement provided, for the first time, comprehensive international minimum standards for enforcing intellectual
property rights.87 However, the agreement still recognizes a member
country’s ability to implement the provisions within its domestic
courts under its own laws.88
b) Domestic Trademark Law Regimes
Another aspect of the international trademark framework is the
disparate registration approaches taken by member countries. The
biggest discrepancy is found between countries that follow a first-
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to-use system, versus those that use a first-to-file system.89 Common
law countries, such as Canada and the United States, rely on a firstto-use system in which the trademark’s first use establishes ownership.90 For instance, in the United States, the Lanham Act requires
that the mark is used in commerce to acquire priority rights at the
United States Patent and Trademark Office (“USPTO”).91 By contrast, first-to-file countries award rights to the first party who registers the trademark or completes the registration process.92 Rather
than relying on the date of first use in commerce, this system looks
to the application date or priority date to determine mark entitlement.93
Traditional trademark squatting—or trademark piracy—is defined by WIPO as “the registration to use a generally well-known
foreign trademark that is not registered in the country or is invalid
as a result of non-use.”94 Although trademark squatting can occur in
any jurisdiction, countries employing a first-to-use system are better
able to deter such practices by requiring demonstration of the mark’s
first use in commerce to assert priority over later copyists.95 In these
countries, because original owners are likely the first to use their
marks, subsequent impostors are prevented from asserting earlier
use in commerce dates.96
Unfortunately, trademark squatting often occurs in first-to-file
countries,97 representing the majority of jurisdictions worldwide.98
Because any party can gain mark registration rights regardless of
actual or prior use in commerce, squatters can take advantage of
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potential owners who are late to file applications in these countries.99 This can pose obstacles for later attempts by the original
brand to register or use the mark in the same jurisdiction when the
same or similar mark has already been registered by a squatter.100
When a third-party races to the trademark office to obtain a registration before the original brand, the result may be two distinct companies operating under the same name but in different countries.101
Merely stealing registrations from original brands, however, is
typically not the end goal for trademark squatters. After registering
another’s mark in a country, a squatter may engage in a variety of
practices, such as selling the mark back to the real owner, distributing counterfeit products that bear the stolen mark, suing the original owner for trademark infringement, or even utilizing the trademark for a line of market products wholly separate from the original
owner’s products.102
2. Unfair Competition Law
The unfair competition doctrine initially grew from protection
gaps in trademark law.103 Dating back to the nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries, the doctrine initially applied to issues between
direct market competitors, in which one competitor sought to deceive buyers by “passing off” their product as that of another by using similar marks, packaging, or advertising.104 Over the years,
trademark protection’s gradual development signaled expansions in
businesses’ legal protection, hence the expansion of unfair competition law.105 Understood most expansively, this doctrine covers any
inequitable conduct in trade.106
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a) International Treaties in Unfair Competition Law
Efforts to implement unfair competition standards through international treaties have generally had the same effect as trademark law
efforts.107 The Paris Convention did not originally provide protection against unfair competition until Article 10bis was added in the
1900 revision.108 Article 10bis defined unfair competition as “any
act of competition contrary to honest practices in industrial or commercial matters,” specifically prohibiting (1) “all acts of such a nature as to create confusion” with a competitor’s establishment,
goods, industrial, or commercial activities; (2) false allegations that
discredit a competitor; and (3) indications or allegations that “mislead the public as to the nature, the manufacturing process, the characteristics, the suitability for their purpose, or the quantity, of the
goods.”109 However, as noted below, treaties’ enforceability, including sections addressing unfair competition matters, have mostly
fallen flat or been codified into domestic jurisprudence.110
b) Domestic Unfair Competition Regimes
Due to different social, political, and economic traditions of nations worldwide, the approaches to unfair competition and commercial practices have created a patchwork of inconsistent legislation
and adjudicative results.111
Beginning with the least comprehensive systems, competition
policy in Asian countries has not gained a great deal of domestic
support compared to European and American counterparts.112 Historically, many countries in East Asia faced difficulties establishing
a culture of free competition as governments frequently invaded the
market to promote industries or establish state-owned enterprises.113
However, a significant number of these nations have enacted
107
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competition laws over the latter half of the twentieth century that
widely vary in coverage, content, and enforcement procedures.114
For example, China enacted the Law of the People’s Republic of
China Against Unfair Competition in 1993.115 Although this was a
significant step toward preventing anticompetitive policies, one of
the act’s stated goals was to safeguard the development of a socialist, market economy.116
Unfair competition law in the United States plays an important
yet modest and supplemental role within the greater intellectual
property framework. In practice, courts tend to consign unfair competition primarily to unregistered trademark infringement actions,
endorsing the proposition that “unfair competition” under the Lanham Act could only apply to “certain unfair trade practices” as defined by the Act’s “inherently limited wording.”117
Every European Union country has codified laws protecting
against unfair competition, or at least against certain commercial
practices.118 Parasitic unfair competition—a subset of unfair competition—has arisen especially in European legislation. The Italian
Civil Code sums up this practice as when an imitator, following a
competitor’s success, continually copies the competitor’s products
and advertisements and all creative, organizational, and business efforts in a parasitic-like fashion.119 Apart from securing stolen trademarks, parasitic unfair competition is the backbone of impostor
companies’ activities. European courts have found parasitic behavior existing in a range of impostor actions, including the imitation of
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similar products, storefronts, interior designs and concepts, and even
shop assistant clothing.120
Although parasitic commercial practices are regulated in a number of nations, implementation and interpretation varies widely. For
example, European Union member nations, such as France and the
Czech Republic, have dedicated entire sections of their Civil or
Commercial Codes to protect against parasitic practices, while other
countries, such as the United Kingdom, rely solely on case law to
police such matters.121 However, the overall ambiguity about the
classification and regulation is a prima facie example of insufficient
and ineffective legislation throughout the entire continent.122
II. THE PROBLEM WITH COUNTERFEITING CLOUT
At its foundation, a legal fake is a copy of a brand, where “legal”
indicates that the fake brand is a trademark—possibly with slight
graphical modifications compared to the original—registered in a
country where the original mark has yet to be launched.123 Although
it appears this grievance may simply be dispensed as traditional
trademark squatting,124 the analysis does not end there. Impostor
companies go beyond traditional squatters and actually put the registered mark to use by copying the brand’s distinctive elements,
from marketing strategies and advertising materials, to fake storefronts.125 Some impostors have been successful in fooling consumers and winning over fans, essentially supplanting the original
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brands in foreign countries where the original brand has yet to establish its business.126
The first section below demonstrates the legal fake phenomenon
through the plight of Supreme, a leading name in streetwear, against
an unknown company whose shameless operation caused an ongoing chain of legal battles worldwide.127 The subsequent sections examine three main issues stemming from the controversy that highlight cracks in the global trademark regime and the challenges growing fashion brands face as they expand globally: (1) weak enforcement of international intellectual property agreements leading to (2)
burdensome litigation and conflicting judgments of well-known
marks, and (3) troublesome media effects that indicate a need for
greater consumer protection.128 Finally, the last section discusses
current attempts to fix such problems.
A. Overview of the Supreme and IBF Controversy
Founded by James Jebbia in 1994, Supreme, an American streetwear brand based in New York City, was originally created for the
skateboard market.129 Similar to its Stüssy predecessor,130 Supreme’s core foundation was the rebellious attitude of young NYC
skateboarders with influences from punk and hip-hop culture.131
Since then, the brand has become “the holy grail of high youth street
culture by curating a mix of the city’s iconography—fashion, music,
celebrity, and politics —within its walls . . . .”132
Supreme’s name and box logo—the now-infamous red and
white rectangle bearing the word “Supreme” in Futura Heavy
Oblique font—has been a source of legal trouble for Supreme from
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the start.133 The logo was an obvious play on the work of renowned
graphic designer, Barbara Kruger, whose white-futura-text-in-redbox designs were already well-known in the industry.134 Although
Jebbia filed to register the logo at the USPTO in March 2013, the
application was rejected on grounds of descriptiveness,135 rather
than similarity to Kruger’s work.136 Further, despite efforts to register its name, Supreme faced repeated refusals due to other registrants
who were already using the mark in similar classes of goods.137 Supreme eventually overcame pushback and secured rights in both its
“SUPREME” name and logo for use on clothing, and eventually for
use on all-purpose sports and athletic bags, fanny packs, and other
forms of apparel.138 But even after amassing dozens of valid registrations by Supreme’s legal counsel, the reach of those trademark
rights remained solely within the United States.139 Given the rights’
jurisdictional limitations and Supreme’s slow filing in other countries, foreign actors have since carried out significant counterfeiting
activities to capitalize on Supreme’s worldwide success.140
Founded in 2015 under the direction of Michele di Pierro, International Brand Firm (“IBF”), a then-unknown company, began laying the foundation for a global trademark-collecting scheme.141 By
2016, through a series of affiliated companies, IBF had built a collection of trademark registrations in over fifty countries, employing
the word “Supreme” and versions of the box logo.142 An overview
133
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of IBF’s brazen venture and the resulting chaos is chronicled below
to illustrate the legal fake problem.
1. The Italian Job
The legal fake’s birthplace can be traced to Barletta, a small and
sleepy town in Southern Italy.143 In 2015, IBF, working through its
affiliated company, Trade Direct SrL, attempted to exploit Italy’s
“first-to-file” trademark system and successfully secured the mark,
“Supreme Italia”—wholly unaffiliated with Jebbia’s Supreme.144
The near-identical mark featured Supreme’s iconic red box and
white Futura Heavy Oblique lettering but appeared much larger on
IBF’s products.145 From its central location in Barletta, IBF successfully presented itself as an international fashion brand distributor,
duping retailers into believing they were purchasing legitimate Supreme products.146 The operation may have continued undetected if
not for a social media stir during the 2016 Pitti Uomo Fair, an international menswear event.147 A post from the event, displaying hoodies and t-shirts bearing IBF’s version of the box logo, eventually
reached Supreme’s legal team in New York, sparking a legal battle
that would rage for years.148
Supreme, acting through its intellectual property holding company, Chapter 4, filed a complaint with the Business Specialized Division of the Court of Milan, alleging IBF was actively engaged in
“counterfeiting activities and unfair competition” by distributing
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“garments bearing a slavish reproduction of Supreme’s [mark].”149
Supreme further cited its own Italian trademark application that predated IBF’s registration by just over a month.150
The Milan court’s first ruling in January 2017 was a win for Supreme: IBF was ordered to cease any production, exportation, and
marketing of clothing and any other products bearing the mark “Supreme”; withdraw from the market any products bearing the mark
(including related advertising or promotional materials); and discontinue using its “supremeitalia.com” domain name.151 Following an
appeal by IBF, in April 2017, the Milan court held again in Supreme’s favor on grounds of parasitic unfair competition.152 This
time, the court confirmed the unlawfulness of IBF’s conduct, citing
trademark counterfeiting under Article 20(a) of the Italian Industrial
Property Code and the independent circumstance of parasitic unfair
competition under Article 2598(3) of the Italian Civil Code.153 The
court found that IBF’s use of Supreme’s logo for an overlapping line
of products, the related promotional images, and even advertising
methods exploited Supreme in a parasitic way by taking advantage
of Supreme’s entrepreneurial success and popularity.154
Following the courts’ decisions, Italian police began seizing unauthorized products.155 In mid-March of 2019, the Italian police
carried out Operation “Golden Brand,” seizing over 700,000 of
IBF’s Supreme-branded items, worth over €10 million.156
2. A Worldwide Heist
Unfortunately for Supreme, IBF’s distribution channels extended far beyond the humble and idyllic Barletta. Initial wins in
149
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Italy were only the beginning of a global battle for the coveted box
logo.157 Civil proceedings in San Marino, China, Spain, and with the
European Union Intellectual Property Office (“EUIPO”) have continuously forced Supreme into legal actions in various jurisdictions
over the years.158
In Spain, IBF filed to register the mark “Supreme Spain,” in
April 2017, beating Supreme to the trademark office by five days.159
This considerably weakened Supreme’s position in litigation and
caused a court in Barcelona to eventually rule in IBF’s favor, rejecting Supreme’s secondary meaning argument that was previously
successful in Italy.160 IBF subsequently began opening fake “Supreme Spain” stores in Madrid, Barcelona, Malaga, Ibiza, and Formentera.161
Headlines in December 2018 brought attention to IBF’s international joyride when Samsung China announced a collaboration with
“Supreme.”162 At a live-streamed product launch conference, two
men introduced as the apparent CEOs of Supreme, announced crossover products between the brands, as well as plans to open a sevenstory flagship store in Beijing and official stores on Chinese e-commerce platforms.163 In reality, Samsung had partnered with IBF’s
“Supreme Italia,” which was quickly revealed through a social media statement released by Jebbia disclaiming any collaboration.164
The uproar and public backlash eventually led Samsung to issue an
official statement terminating the collaboration with IBF’s
157
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“Supreme Italia.”165 This bold move by IBF was followed by counterfeit fashion shows, duplications of Supreme’s invoices, shopping
bags, signage, and even claims in March 2019 of opening a new
brick-and-mortar retail location at a popular Shanghai shopping
strip.166 However, according to several news sources, Supreme’s legal counsel communicated that IBF’s store had not officially opened
and the footage of people queuing outside were paid actors posing
as customers.167
From the manufactured scarcity and meager twelve stores
worldwide, to the uphill battle faced by a logo considered too general and descriptive by some courts, there is an argument that Supreme is to blame for failing to internationally register its marks
sooner.168 Fortunately for Supreme, it now appears di Pierro’s longwinded heist has run its course. Following the seizure of IBF’s
branded products from stores and warehouses169 and the eventual
recognition of Supreme’s mark ownership by Chinese and European
Union courts, IBF ceased all retail operations worldwide.170 In a decision on June 25, 2021, a London court sentenced di Pierro to eight
years in prison for “hijack[ing] every facet of [Supreme]’s identity.”171 Despite the Supreme-IBF saga coming to a close, the tactics
used by this impostor company reflect a new level of sophistication
in the unauthorized use and duping of less-informed consumers.
B. Ripped Seams of the Current Legal Framework
Demonstrated by IBF’s worldwide operations, the biggest danger posed by legal fakes occurs when impostors take advantage of
the current global intellectual property framework to promote
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unlawful activities.172 A secondary, consumer protection concern
arises from the media’s active role shaping the public’s perception
of the controversy.173 The following sections highlight three main
issues relating to these concerns that have potential ramifications for
brands spanning the fashion industry, indicating the international
trademark regime’s need for reform.
1. Grey-Area Trademark Squatting
The strongest hold that impostors such as IBF have over original
brands originates from the differing trademark systems between
countries, permitting squatters to register stolen marks.174 Supreme
fell victim to this situation when IBF began collecting registrations
worldwide for the stolen box logo mark.175 Although Supreme acquired domestic rights to use its mark in the United States after many
registration attempts, trademark rights were limited to the United
States and several other countries where brick-and-mortar stores resided. By beating Supreme to registration in a multitude of foreign
countries under first-to-file systems, IBF essentially barred Supreme
from expanding into those markets.176
As mentioned above, simply stealing registrations from original
brands is usually only the initial move for squatters.177 Impostors
like IBF take squatting to the next level. Not only did IBF register
the box logo mark in various countries spanning Europe and Asia,
but also copied products, opened fake stores, impersonated highlevel Supreme executives, fabricated invoices, and utilized similarlooking shopping bags.178 This level of impersonation can place
brands like Supreme, who have yet to break into certain foreign markets, in an expensive bind.
Ideally, current international treaties would prevent impostor
companies from squatting on stolen marks, regardless of first-to-
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file/first-to-use registration regime.179 Article 6bis of the Paris Convention originally sought to provide protection for well-known
marks through an agreement to police domestic trademark registries
on behalf of foreign owners of famous marks already registered in
other member countries.180 However, the widespread reach of IBF
and similar companies reveals these provisions ultimately deal with
the issue ineffectively.
There are multiple explanations for this ineffective protection of
brand owners against impostor companies. The first explanation is
the general lack of domestic enforcement of international measures
among member states.181 Because the sections use broad language,
providing rather minimal enforcement standards, treaties such as the
TRIPS Agreement have made interpretation difficult for mediators
or dispute-settlement panels to identify clear-cut violations of trademark infringement.182 Further, not all members hold the treaties as
directly enforceable.183 For example, for any Paris Convention provision to have legal impact in the United States, there must be congressional implementation through domestic legislation.184 Various
provisions of the Lanham Act loosely embody obligations imposed
by the Paris Convention but require action through domestic laws.185
Further, practical factors—history, economics, negotiation, and
technology—explain how multinational intellectual property agreements struggle to provide effective global enforcement.186 For example, international intellectual property agreements’ historical legacy demonstrates the failure to develop strong enforcement, attributed first to the origins of international agreement and now to the
developed countries’ misguided implementation tactics.187 Economically, strong enforcement requires a substantial investment of resources and supporting infrastructure—a cost that not all countries
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are willing to allocate.188 These economic costs, coupled with disciplinary costs, can include building new institutional infrastructures
or restructuring existing agencies, or even developing specialized
expertise, staffing courts, police forces, and prisons.189 With many
of the world’s least developed countries still struggling to meet basic
needs (electricity, school, healthcare, etc.), it is understandable why
enforcement is a highly sensitive issue in international intellectual
property negotiations.190 Relatedly, negotiation challenges arise
when dealing with delicate topics such as resource allocation and
capacity questions.191 Due to delays in discussing enforcement
measures and deliberate efforts to inject ambiguities in treaty language, many countries complain about the standards’ unfair and biased nature.192 Finally, the advent of the internet and new communication technologies has, to some extent, rendered the TRIPS
Agreement obsolete even before it became effective.193 All of these
factors that countries weigh when enforcing international treaties
(especially considering the fashion industry’s high-paced and globalized network) have allowed impostor companies to slip through
the cracks of policing provisions.
2. Burdensome Litigation and Inconsistent Rulings
A closely related issue stemming from disparate trademark systems is the burdensome litigation that ensues once a brand decides
to reclaim stolen rights. The TRIPS Agreement stipulates that a legal
proceeding’s venue is the contracting state’s domestic courts. Accordingly, under domestic laws, a single brand—victim to a legal
fake scheme—must pursue litigation in every country where an opposing trademark has been filed if all rights are to be reclaimed.194
As discussed above, Supreme’s litigation in Milan was only the beginning of a worldwide pursuit to end IBF’s illicit activities.195 Although perhaps a headache for the legal team, Supreme ultimately
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has sufficient resources at its disposal to pursue litigation, per a reported valuation of $1 billion in 2017.196 However, this is not a viable option for all brands fighting back against impostor companies.
Not only is litigation costly and time-consuming, but the Supreme controversy also demonstrates that courts do not consistently
rule in favor of the original mark owner.197 Although Supreme was
initially successful in stopping IBF’s operations in Italy, Supreme’s
case proved futile in Spain despite advancing the same arguments of
counterfeiting and unfair competitive activities.198 This inconsistency stems from widely disparate interpretations of the broad international treaty language.199 For example, the well-known marks
provision originally cited in Article 6bis of the Paris Convention,
and subsequently in Article 16 of the TRIPS Agreement, fails to define “well-known.”200 Rather, the treaties encourage countries to
“take account of the knowledge of the trademark in the relevant sector of the public, including knowledge in the Member concerned
which has been obtained as a result of the promotion of the trademark.”201 In effect, member countries are tasked with determining
the meaning and validity of a well-known mark on a case-by-case
basis, leading to inconsistent rulings despite the same actions being
brought.202
Although every European Union nation universally detests unfair commercial practices and parasitism, every member nation’s
laws on the matter diverge according to tradition, preferences, and
domestic caselaw.203 This is compounded by impostor companies’
activities varying between countries of operation. IBF’s operations
in Italy, though infamous, were located in a modest town—
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notwithstanding the amount of product it moved.204 IBF’s operations in China, however, made international headlines with its
highly-publicized collaboration scandal and plans to open a sevenstory flagship store in Shanghai.205 Domestic courts evaluating varying activities discretionarily decide whether a mark is unfairly appropriated.206 Because of this, a single brand attempting to reclaim
the rights to its name in various countries will likely face a myriad
of obstacles proving infringement against local law. Although disparate laws preserve member countries’ autonomy and variety, this
scheme is ultimately at odds with an increasingly global fashion
market and multi-country counterfeit schemes.
3. Concern for Consumer Protection
Legal fakes also illuminate an increasing concern over consumer
protection. Consumer protection efforts are designed to protect consumers against unfair trade and credit practices involving consumer
goods, as well as faulty and dangerous goods.207 Although the struggle to educate consumers about counterfeit products has long existed
in the fashion industry,208 the legal fake phenomenon reflects an attitude edging toward acceptance of illicit products and impostor
companies. Not only does this deprive original designers of the
fruits of their labor, broader safety and ethical concerns are implicated as well.209
The shady origins of the term “legal fake” play a big role in
shaping this concern. Although the phrase sounds like legal jargon,
the term is not found in any legal dictionary.210 It spontaneously occurred in the 2010s at the height of Supreme and IBF’s pending
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litigation in Italian courts.211 One online magazine site, nss Magazine, covered the story and began using the term “legal fake” in reference to IBF212 as a “legal copy of a brand, where ‘legal’ indicates
that the fake brand is a trademark registered in a country . . . where
the original mark has yet to be launched.”213
On closer inspection, certain facts of this origin story give rise
to suspicion. Since its publication, the term has been used extensively and almost exclusively in reference to this particular debacle.214 The Sportsware Magazine, another source that used the term,
registered its website domain under IBF founder di Pierro’s name,215
and articles published on the site during the litigation almost exclusively pertained to Supreme and IBF.216 Reports from these sites are
further responsible for widespread inaccuracies about the Supreme
and IBF conflict. For example, a July 2018 article published in nss
Magazine, incorrectly stated that Supreme lost a case to IBF in Italy.217 In reality, the court ordered three of IBF’s domain names,
“www.supremeitalia.com,” “www.supremeitalita.it,” and “brandshopstore.com” be returned to IBF after being subject to a courtordered block during litigation.218 The article further omits reportage on the court’s order barring IBF from manufacturing and selling
products bearing the Supreme label, instead framing IBF’s activities
as “minor crimes of unfair competition and civil offense.”219
These events hint at the question of conspiracy: did IBF invent
a new term to describe their activities? Did IBF exert any influence
over the media’s coverage to shape public opinions? Regardless of
whether the creation of “legal fake” was a public relations technique
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to shape the narrative, impostor companies have benefitted from the
term by painting a prettier picture of activities which would otherwise be branded as counterfeiting and grey-area trademark squatting.220 To a trained lawyer or industry expert, IBF’s actions are
clearly “misleading and technically erroneous.”221 However, to the
average consumer, the word “legal” may give a false sense of legitimacy to these actions.222 Jebbia himself acknowledged that “it
would be sad if a new generation thinks [legal fakes are] actually
legit[imate].”223
On a broader level, legitimizing legal fakes raises serious safety
and ethical concerns. By legitimizing these practices, consumers
who brush past the misnomer are ultimately supporting the manufacture and distribution of counterfeit products.224 Counterfeit items
often raise serious safety concerns, such as the use of harmful substances in the fabrics of garments.225 Because low-cost coloring
agents and unsafe chemicals are frequently used in manufacturing
fakes, consumers are at risk of serious health concerns.226 Legitimizing the use of counterfeits and legal fakes also implicates broader
ethical concerns over labor conditions. The exploitive use of forced
labor within the counterfeit industry has grown exponentially in recent years.227 Many consumers of counterfeit products are unaware
of such human rights violations, ranging from factory disasters to
severely underpaid workers.228 Although there are no overt links between legal fakes and unethical or unsafe counterfeit practices, legitimizing legal fakes is the first step in acquiescing to illicit practices in the fashion industry as a whole.
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C. Current Proposed Solutions in the Field
Current solutions proposed by scholars mainly focus on broad
international trademark reform to mitigate general problems within
the fashion industry.229 By grouping legal fake concerns with similar
infringement or counterfeit issues, most solutions aim for high-level
reform or cooperation among governing bodies to solve an array of
problems.230
One proposed effort seeks to strengthen global trademark enforcement at the world organizational level. A solution proposed by
Zachary Shufro advocates for cooperation between WTO and WIPO
in establishing an international tribunal to handle trademark disputes.231 Under this effort, a trademark-specific tribunal handles
cases in which “a trademark holder in one country suspects that their
trademark rights are not being sufficiently accorded Madrid Protocol deference in another jurisdiction.”232 A similar effort proposed
by Shufro looks to expand the WIPO Arbitration and Mediation
Center’s existing jurisdiction to handle international trademark
cases.233 At present, jurisdiction for these tribunals is limited to disputes in which parties have a pre-existing mediation or arbitration
agreement that specifies the WIPO Arbitration and Mediation Center as the venue.234
Other efforts, such as that proposed by Timothy W. Blakely at
the University of Pennsylvania, seek to establish a unitary transnational system of trademark protection.235 This solution suggests using the Community Trademark System (“CTM”), an European Union-based trademark-harmonization effort, as a model for a worldwide trademark system.236
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III. MAKING ALTERATIONS TO AN ILL-FITTING FRAMEWORK
In an ideal world, every brand owner from any country would
file their mark early with a world trademark registry, and every international dispute would be handled by a single tribunal under the
same laws. This would have allowed Supreme, a U.S. company, to
gain worldwide rights to its mark and streamline litigation under a
single court tasked with adjudicating any dispute with IBF, a British
company, should it arise. However, the effort required to overhaul
domestic laws and create a worldwide trademark system in hopes
that brands will automatically know to file their marks early is
highly unrealistic. The type of solution needed is one that seeks to
operate in the real-life scenario of countries with inevitably varying
laws, and in which impostor companies are free to capitalize on
brands that are not quick enough to register their marks.
The proposed solution advocates for international trademark
system reform within continental blocs, with the goal of domestic
law harmonization and streamlined adjudication across country borders. By creating regional trademark offices that register from a bloc
of countries, brand owners seeking protection for marks will be
granted a bundle of rights from a single filing. At the same time, the
push for harmonization of trademark laws within a bloc will preserve the domestic jurisprudence of each individual country while
providing consistent outcomes for a case brought in multiple countries—as in the case of Supreme. The solution, broken into two main
portions, will be discussed in more detail below. The first portion
describes the necessary steps to create and manage continental
trademark registries. The second portion looks to recent attempts of
regional harmonization of trademark laws on a continental basis and
further delineates measures for international dispute resolution.
A. Regional Trademark Registration
The first portion of the proposed solution is establishing regional
trademark registries or offices. This is first accomplished by grouping WIPO-member countries into separate regions based on geographic, economic, and cultural factors, among others.237
237
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Continental division (i.e., North America, Asia) is likely to be the
most efficient and effective grouping as demonstrated by previous
harmonization routes and treaties.238 Countries within a continental
bloc are in the best position to establish similar cross-nation trademark systems. Although the China Trademark Office (“CTMO”)239
and the USPTO240 are well-established agencies in powerful nations, establishing continent-wide offices to handle international
marks better serves the needs of growing brands in an increasingly
global economy. It should be noted that this solution does not request the dissolution of current national trademark offices already in
place. Rather, looking to EUIPO as a model, this solution advocates
for establishing an additional cross-nation trademark system to prosecute applicants who seek protection in all member countries within
a region.
Regarding the continental trademark office’s specific duties, existing institutions created for regional registration provide a starting
point for worldwide implementation. Specifically, the current European system, though imperfect, shows promise as a model for other
countries in continental blocs to follow suit. The European Union
trademark (“EUTM”) is a trademark registration granted by the
EUIPO.241 A EUTM mark has uniform effect in all European Union
member states242 and has automatic legal force without necessitating
separate national legislation.243 As a separate legal entity within the
European Union, EUIPO issues registrations after examination and
search for previous marks both within the EUIPO-specific registry
238
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and registries from individual member nations.244 The main advantage of a EUTM registration is the cross-nation protection while
lowering the cost and time needed for filing separate applications in
individual member nations.245
The possible benefits of implementing similar EUTM offices in
other continental blocs include not only preventing impostors from
legal fake activities, but also providing flexible options to growing
brands. Because new brands may not have the resources nor foresight to register their marks in certain markets worldwide, any country not listed in the trademark filing is vulnerable to impostor companies. Continental registration streamlines the process by which
brands can expand their business into a selection region of the global
market. Given that a new brand will file or use its mark as early as
possible (depending on whether the bloc is decidedly a first-to-file
or first-to-use system), this solution would bar impostor companies
from exploiting the market of any country within that region.
The unfortunate reality is that original brands are not always able
to beat squatters. The principles of streetwear seemingly dictate an
unhurried expansion into markets to preserve its exclusive nature.246
On its face, the possibility of impostor companies barring original
brands from entire continental markets is daunting. However, the
second portion of the proposed solution addresses this concern by
proposing harmonization at the domestic level.
B. Regional Harmonization of Trademark Laws
As discussed above, continental trademark registration does not
fully solve the problem of impostor companies stealing original
brand owners’ marks and setting up legal fake schemes.247 The second component of the solution aims to harmonize trademark laws
between countries within a bloc. In the case where an original owner
seeks to reclaim a stolen mark, harmonized laws will hopefully lead
to consistent outcomes in litigation.
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“Harmonization is the process by which the varying laws of different sovereign entities are changed to more closely reflect a common set of legal principles agreed to by those sovereign entities.”248
Because global harmonization of trademark laws may be too ambitious given the current patchwork of intellectual property laws
worldwide, this solution presents regional harmonization along the
same continental blocs established by the trademark offices set forth
in the prior section.249
Although mostly ineffective, previous efforts to promote harmonization along continental lines provide a helpful guide in the ongoing pursuit for unification.250 For example, the Unfair Commercial
Practices Directive was a prior European effort for full harmonization of unfair competition and consumer protection laws.251 Other
efforts, such as the Trademark Law Treaty, Trademark Registration
Treaty, and the Madrid Protocol have similarly been enacted over
the years with limited success.252 Despite unclear language, overambitious goals, and general lack of enforcement resulting from most
of these agreements, steady continued efforts through such international coalitions are a step in the right direction toward regional harmonization.
Free Trade Agreements (“FTAs”) among member countries
within a continental region are another promising route through
which harmonization of intellectual property standards can be promulgated. Since the mid-nineties, countries interested in higher intellectual property standards have shifted negotiations toward FTAs to
expand on the TRIPS Agreement provisions.253 Because FTAs are
negotiated frequently,254 member countries can consider changing
economic and developmental needs for stronger intellectual
248
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property protection as different concerns, such as the growing threat
of legal fakes, come to light.
Finally, with the establishment of continental trademark offices,
an associated adjudicative body, such as the Trademark Trials and
Appeal Board (“TTAB”) within the USPTO, can oversee adversary
proceedings.255 Bloc-based opposition or cancellation proceedings
would streamline litigation that would otherwise be handled on a
country-by-country basis.
C. Benefits of the Proposed Solution
The proposed solution aims to overcome weaknesses in the current trademark framework and in the scholar-proposed solutions. A
major weakness in the current trademark scheme is the member
countries’ ability to opt-out of international treaties completely. A
country that chooses to opt-out or limit the degree to which an international governing system has jurisdiction over domestic affairs,
places that country outside any arbitration power that WIPO may
hold. The proposed solution avoids this pitfall by making changes
to the domestic laws of member countries through extensive harmonization efforts. Although it may take time for countries within a
bloc to agree on standards of trademark enforcement, even slight
amendments to domestic law will be more effective than countries
disregarding broad promulgations of international standards.
The proposed solution also advocates for specific trademark and
unfair competition reform on a realistic scale. This contrasts with
the main philosophy underlying previously-proposed solutions that
advocate for sweeping changes at international levels to solve a multitude of smaller trademark issues—legal fakes being one of many.
Because a legal fake dispute is highly specific in the exploited market spaces, the type and extent of impostor activities, and relief
sought, it is unclear to what degree WIPO tribunals will be able to
halt activities in every country. This issue is compounded by the
need for finding judges to appoint to WIPO tribunals (whether due
to the expertise level needed or geopolitical disputes) and logistical
difficulties in handling an international docket. A more effective
255
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solution would be to reform the trademark system on a smaller scale
that resolves disputes before they reach international proportions.
This is demonstrated by the proposed solution’s establishment of
trademark registration mechanisms and harmonized laws at the domestic and regional levels, targeted to prevent legal fakes. Although
this solution is specific to the issue at bay, the effects of a cohesive
worldwide trademark regime will mitigate similar counterfeiting
and squatting issues.
D. Critiques of the Proposed Solution
The main critique of the proposed solution lies in fact that impostor companies can still preempt an original brand owner by
squatting in any country or region where the owner has no registered
mark. Even more harrowing is the potential for impostors to oust the
owner from an entire bundle of countries in a regional proximity.
For example, had Supreme only registered its mark within the North
American trademark office (as created by the proposed solution),
IBF would be free to conduct illicit business in all member countries
in the European bloc and around the world upon successful registration.
Despite these shortcomings, the proposed solution aims to operate in the real world where deadlines are missed and brands cannot
always predict growth into previously-untapped markets. As such,
the continental harmonization portion of the solution acts as a safety
net for brands that find themselves victims of legal fake schemes.
Even though original brand owners may need to pursue litigation in
the various courts within a continental bloc, harmonization of laws
within a bloc will lead to consistent judicial outcomes. Further, a
more synchronous cross-nation trademark system can be achieved
with cooperation and global recognition of the need for reform.
CONCLUSION
Streetwear brands have recently faced an onslaught of attacks
from impostor brands who seek to sell exclusive merchandise—normally reserved for the class of elite influencers—to a wider audience. In essence, impostors seek to bring clout to the masses. Despite efforts to paint themselves as the “Robin Hoods” of streetwear,
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impostors cannot escape the fact that their actions amount to unlawful activities. As evidenced by the rise and fall of IBF worldwide,
efforts to cash in on the legal fake scheme eventually end in cumbersome litigation and eventual seizure of goods. Ultimately, the
damage done to victim brands demonstrates a need for reform
among the trademark and unfair competition laws worldwide. An
ambitious yet long-term and realistic solution looks to previous
models and efforts that advocate for continental harmonization of
laws and trademark systems. Only then will all brands, regardless of
style, subcategory, or size, be able to promote and protect their
names in an increasingly globalized fashion market.

